The United States has ratified various treaties impinging on traditional areas of state concern.
Introduction
Throughout U.S. history, the interests of the states' have often conflicted with treaty obligations. 2 Traditionally, however, U.S. law has been a strict parent and suppressed this conflict by asserting that, as far as treaties are concerned, states should neither be seen nor heard. 3 Adopting a more progressive parenting technique, the U.S. federal government, in a nod to the principles of federalism, has recently allowed the states to make their presence felt in the realm of treaty compliance in two ways. First, the executive branch and the Senate have attached statements to treaties indicating that the federal government will implement its obligations under the treaties only as far as the federal system allows and that additional implementation will be left to the states. 4 These statements are known as federalism reservations. 5 Second, the federal government allowed the states to heavily influence the enforcement of certain International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) orders stemming from treaty violations. 6 Like the best efforts of many well-meaning parents, these more tolerant practices have failed to resolve the underlying conflict and have created fresh problems. They only marginally protect the principles of federalism and turn out to be in serious tension with international law.
The U.S. practice of unilaterally attaching federalism reservations to multilateral treaties has historic roots 7 but has been used most significantly in three human rights treaties ratified within the last twenty years. 8 The U.S. executive branch and Senate attached reservations to these treaties because of concerns that treaty obligations might interfere with areas of traditional state concern. 9 These reservations have two important components. First, they declare the attached treaties to be nonself executing,° meaning that they must be implemented before going into effect. I " Second, they proclaim that the treaties "shall be implemented by the federal government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments."' 2 These reservations bring states into the treaty process by, on their face, allowing states to choose whether to implement any of the treaty provisions that affect areas of state concern. 3 State interests, however, are only partially served by this practice because the federal government can, on a whim, decide not to attach any reservations to a treaty.
14 This is not the only drawback to the reservations. By giving the choice of implementing certain treaty obligations to the states, the U.S. federal government seems to have waived responsibility for those obligations. Because of this apparent waiver, the federalism reservations potentially violate international law.1 5 Furthermore, they are 11. Ku, supra note 3, at 462. The default rule in the United States is that treaties are self-executing, meaning they come into legal force as soon as they are ratified. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
(1987) (explaining that courts must give direct effect to international law and that treaties are only "non-self executing" under special conditions). Although "self-executing" treaties are legally binding and can be upheld in court, some form of active implementation may still be required in order to meet the specific obligations of the treaty. See Ku, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing state implementation of self-executing treaties); see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
12. Race Convention reservations, supra note 10, at II; see also ICCPR reservations, supra note 10, at 11(5); Torture Convention reservations, supra note 10, at 11(5).
13. See Ku, supra note 3, at 525 (stating that non-self-execution clauses preclude judicial enforcement and that states are likely left with jurisdiction over the treaty with which the federal government cannot interfere). Whether the federalism reservations succeed in leaving the choice to implement treaties to the states is, as a legal matter, hotly debated. While Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have defended the legal validity of the reservations, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 401-02, others contend that they serve no legal purpose because the U.S. federal government has jurisdiction over all matters arising under a treaty. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995) [hereinafter, Henkin, Ghost].
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16 (explaining that the executive branch and the Senate have the choice whether to attach federalism reservations to treaties).
15. For example, according to Professor M. CherifBassiouni: "Good faith" is a basic requirement in the law of treaties, and a "reservation" or [Vol. 24:1 generally disfavored in treaty talks because negotiating nations view them as illegitimate attempts by federal nations to reduce their obligations under the proposed treaties. 16 The conflict between state interests and treaty obligations has been particularly bitter in reference to a series of binding ICJ orders based on U.S. violations of treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter VCCR). 17 The ICJ orders have required the like which expressly holds that the treaty at issue does not impose any duty on the United States to enact implementing legislation that may be contrary to the Constitution as interpreted by domestic law and judicial interpretations violates that basic principle. For all practical purposes, this "reservation" leaves the United States free from any legal obligation under the ICCPR whenever, in its sole discretion, it decides not to implement it legislatively. In fact, this "reservation" allows Congress, at any time, to pass a law contrary to an ICCPR provision and have it supersede the treaty. Also, it allows any federal judge to hold that a given statute or court decision supersedes the
ICCPR. This open-ended approach to treaties is incompatible with international law, much as it is incompatible with common sense and good judgment. 278, 292 (1982) , for the proposition that in some cases non-federal states may agree to federalism reservations in order to encourage wider accession to a treaty). 18 and the review of convictions and sentencing of certain foreign nationals in the United States. 1 9 Regarding the orders staying executions, the U.S. federal government under President Clinton pursued a course of action that was sensitive to federalism concerns. The government argued that it could not interfere with state criminal proceedings 20 and limited its enforcement of the orders to functionally non-binding communiquds and letters requesting state compliance. 2 [I] n the exercise of his constitutionally based foreign affairs power, and his authority under the United Nations Charter, the President has determined that compliance should be achieved by the enforcement of the ICJ decision in state courts in accordance with principles of comity. That presidential determination, like an executive agreement, has independent legal force and effect, and contrary state rules must give way under the Supremacy administration is more concerned with international law and order than with federalism. At about the same time as plans regarding the review orders were made public, the federal government announced its withdrawal from the provisions of the VCCR that allow disputes arising under it to be heard by the ICJ. 27 Considering that, in order to resolve the Iran hostage crisis, the United States was the first country to appeal to the ICJ under its VCCR jurisdiction, 28 this is a substantial sacrifice presumably made on behalf of the states in order to insulate them from future ICJ rulings. The courts continue to confront cases arising from the ICJ review orders, 29 and the states are likely to challenge Bush's order requiring state court review of sentencing. 30 The ongoing conflict is disturbing evidence that the federal government has yet to find a satisfactory method of reconciling state interests and treaty obligations.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United
To unsettle matters even more, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a bevy of recent opinions that signal potential constitutional limits on the federal government's ability to impose treaty obligations on the states. 31 Clause United States would develop a treaty-making and compliance process that encompasses its federal system of government without sacrificing international law. 36 The observation that federal systems of government and compliance with international law do not always go hand-in-hand is not new, 37 and it is no surprise that other federal nations have faced problems balancing state interests and international obligations. 38 Over the last thirty years, one federally organized nation in particular, Australia, which is composed of six states and two territories, 39 has adopted procedural reforms designed to address this issue by developing a role for states in its treaty-making process in a manner that does not undermine compliance with treaty obligations. 40 In 41 This caters to federalism by giving states a platform to voice misgivings about treaties that infringe on their traditional areas of concern. With this platform, states can put political pressure on the federal government to either modify those treaties or not ratify them at all. 42 This arrangement, however, does not alter the federal government's supremacy in foreign affairs, and it retains power over the states to uphold international law and any treaties that have been adopted. 43 The goal of this article is to examine Australian reforms and evaluate whether they represent a viable option in the U.S. legal and political environment for reconciling federalism and the international law of treaties. 44 While there is a mountain of scholarship examining the appropriate role of federalism in U.S. treaty relations and proposing methods for its incorporation, 45 (1997) ("through the High Court's expansive interpretation of Commonwealth powers it has been possible for the Government to initiate and for Parliament to enact legislation designed to give effect to international law. This legislative capacity has been an important element in ensuring that Australia has been able to play an active and responsible role in international affairs."); see also Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37, at 12 ("The upshot of the High Court's interpretation of federal legislative power over external affairs is that Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever their subject matter.").
44. 47. In Printz v. New York, Justice Scalia deemed "such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.... The fact is that our federalism is not Europe's." Part I of this article analyzes the historical role of U.S. states in treaty making and the potential legal changes that might alter that role. Part I also briefly considers and critiques some of the current academic proposals for incorporating federalism in U.S. foreign affairs. Part II compares federalism in pre-reform Australian foreign affairs to the historical situation in the United States. Part II continues by describing the recent procedural changes and examining the results of those reforms. Part III analyzes the appropriateness of the Australian reforms for the United States by examining the practical and legal consequences of adopting the reforms. The article concludes that although wholesale U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms would be impractical because of the far greater number of states within the U.S. than in Australia, incorporating some of the reforms would be an attractive method for including federalism in U.S. foreign affairs.
I.
State Involvement in the U.S. Treaty-making Process
The Framers addressed the question of the appropriate role of states in the treaty process when they adopted the U.S. Constitution. 51 Because state interference in foreign affairs had nearly driven the country to war under the Articles of Confederation, 52 the Framers designed the Constitution to give the federal government supremacy in all treaty matters. 5 3 In order to accomplish this, the Constitution generally excises the states from foreign affairs. 54 The Framers, however, attempted to create balance by giving states an advise-and-consent role in the treaty process. Contrary to their intentions, states as a rule no longer participate in treaty making.
Under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, the Framers gave the treatymaking power to the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate... provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." At the founding, Senators were appointed by state legislatures and thus, at least in the Framers' conception, represented state interests when considering treaties. 55 The Framers' intent was that Senators would actively advise the President during treaty negotiations and possess the power to reject a treaty by refusing consent. 56 The Framers' intentions, however, were stymied almost immediately when the George Washington administration abandoned the practice of seeking Senate advice during treaty negotiations. 57 State ability to consent to or reject treaties through representation in the Senate fared better, lasting until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 . 58 The Seventeenth Amendment requires the popular election of Senators and thus eliminated the Senate's traditional role as protecting the concerns of state institutions. 59 [hereinafter Kramer, Putting Politics] (stating that the Seventeenth Amendment eliminated "the one feature of the Senate that really might have protected states, the power of state legislators to choose Senators"). Professor Kramer argues that Senate concern with federalism issues probably dried up even before the Seventeenth Amendment because Senators' long terms insulated them from effective review by state legislatures. Kramer, Putting Politics, supra at 224 n.33. Professor Golove argues that the Senate continues to represent state interests by obstructing treaties, but Swaine convincingly challenges that argument, explaining that obstructionism has "no necessary connection with any genuine commitment to federalism." Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 413 n.31 (citing Golove, supra note 2, at 1294-99).
59. Anderson, supra note 49, at 232.
[Vol. 6 3 One of these corporations had a deposit account with Belmont, a private banker in New York. In 1933, the Soviet Union assigned, via an international compact, its interest in the account (and numerous other assets) to the United States. 64 Under the agreement, the United States would inform the Soviet Union of all amounts that it realized under the assignment. 65 The goal of the agreement was to bring about settlement of rival claims between the two countries. 66 The appellate court held that the assignment violated a New York policy prohibiting enforcement of confiscatory degrees issued by foreign governments. 67 This ruling came despite lower court decisions citing principles of federalism that had rejected a similar federal statute enacted prior to the treaty. 7 2 Holland has come to stand for the principle that the federal government's treaty power, unlike other constitutional powers, is not subject to federalism limits. 73 While this ruling gives the federal government enormous power in regards to its treaties, Professor David M. Golove makes a lengthy and convincing argument that this is exactly what the Framers intended. 74 In order to prevent the states' abuse of treaties that occurred under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers had good cause to adopt a system where treaties, once adopted, could not be undermined. 75 Without state advice and consent in deciding what treaties to adopt, however, the Holland decision gives the federal government a broad treaty-making power without regard for state concerns.
As indicated in the Introduction, the President and the Senate attempted to strengthen the state role in the treaty process during the last two decades by introducing federalism reservations to treaties and not seeking enforcement of ICJ rulings. 7 [Vol. 24:1 of political decisionmaking and not the result of the fundamental structure of U.S. law. First, if the federal government were concerned about the legality of the federalism reservations, it could simply withdraw them. Second, while the Clinton administration insisted that it could not force the states to comply with ICJ rulings, 77 the federal government has successfully sued states to force compliance in the past. 78 Thus, the federal government appears to maintain the final word as to whether or not the United States meets its treaty obligations and has merely made a political choice at times to favor state interests over international obligations. 79 The nature of U.S. incapacity to meet obligations could change, however, if the Supreme Court applies certain substantive, procedural, and remedial limits on the federal treaty power that appear to follow from the Court's federalism jurisprudence in other areas. These limits would formalize state power in the treaty process, while making compliance with international obligations substantially more difficult. 80 In analyzing these limits, this article relies on a recent and comprehensive article by Professor Edward T. Swaine . 1982) ). Ku argues that such suits have only been brought to enforce treaties that were self-executing and thus don't apply to the ICJ orders, which he argues are non-self executing. Ku, supra note 3, at 517-18. Ku states that the only other times the federal government has sued to enforce treaty obligations have been in cases involving American Indian treaties where the federal government was considered a "guardian" of Indian interests. Id. at 491 n. 174 84. Bradley summarizes his argument in Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 45, at 100-0 1 (arguing that the best rule for applying federalism limits to the treaty power "would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any subject but would limit their ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress's power to do so"); see Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 45, at 456 (explaining "the option I favor, would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism restrictions that apply to Congress's legislative powers. Under this approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress's legislative powers, such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions"). 86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("'[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)).
87. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("'Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern.., the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur ... ' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (characterizing RFRA as "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens"). [Vol. 24:1 limit Congress's authority in other areas to the treaty power, 88 and Bradley states that the case would, therefore, have to be overturned. 89 Although Swaine suggests more subtle strategies the Court might use to limit Holland, 90 he agrees its reversal is a possibility. 91 The reversal of Holland would protect states by preventing U.S. enforcement of treaties that circumvent traditional limits on federal power. For example, in reference to Holland, the federal government could no longer rely on its treaty power to enforce a migratory bird statute that Congress could not implement with its commerce power. 92 While Holland's reversal might protect state interests, it would seriously interfere with U.S. ability to meet treaty obligations. If federal legislation implementing older treaties were struck down as violating federalism principles, the United States would find itself without a means of enforcing those treaties and would, therefore, be in violation of its obligations.
A potential procedural limit on the treaty power arises from the Court's recent application of the anticommandeering principle. VCCR, however, entails a certain measure of active implementation because one of its provisions requires that officials notify arrested foreign nationals of their right to communicate with their consulate. 97 In the Committee on Foreign Relations' report on the VCCR, members of the Senate recognized that the states would need to fulfill some of the treaty's obligations because state officers control many arrests. 98 While state enforcement of the VCCR has not been particularly effective, 99 it appears to be the only practical method of adopting the treaty. 00 If the anticommandeering principle were applied to the VCCR, however, the federal government could not ask state officers to fulfill the treaty's obligations. 10 Although the anticommandeering principle would have a negative impact on U.S. ability to meet treaty obligations, its benefits for state interests are perhaps limited. While the principle would prevent the federal government from burdening states with certain treaty obligations, it could also prevent the federal government from seeking federalism reservations designed to protect states. Federalism reservations protect states not only by potentially allowing them to choose whether to implement treaties at all, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, but also by giving them flexibility to implement treaties in a manner they see fit. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. According to Professor Carlos Manuel V6.zquez, if applied in the treaty context, the anticommandeering principle would render federalism reservations unconstitutional because they leave legislative implementation of treaties to states thus commandeering state legislatures. Vdzquez, The Treaty Power, supra, at 1354-56. If this came to pass and the federal government still wished to implement a treaty to which reservations were attached, it could enforce the treaty directly using federal officials instead of state legislatures. This would harm states by taking away their control over implementation of these treaties, leaving them at the mercy of the federal government's enforcement techniques. Of the federalism limits on the treaty power that the Court could potentially adopt, the application of the state sovereign immunity doctrine as a remedial limit seems the most probable and imminent. In two cases arising from the ICJ disputes mentioned above, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that under the Eleventh Amendment foreign governments probably cannot sue states for violations of a treaty.' 0 4 If these dicta are followed, it will mean that foreign nations and nationals cannot sue states to meet treaty obligations that have been assigned to those states through federalism reservations or simply by default, as in the case of the VCCR. 1 05 By not providing remedies to certain treaty violations, the United States would potentially be in further breach of these treaties and even more at odds with international law.1 0 6
If any of these judicial limits on the federal treaty power come to pass, they would legally cement a preference for states' rights over international obligations and make the federal government's compliance with treaties very difficult. One would hope, however, that the Court, as much as the federal government, would prefer a method of incorporating federalism in the treaty process that neither undermines international obligations nor too severely challenges the legal structure that has been built to protect the states.
Academic responses to the current tension in the U.S. between federalism and treaty obligations tend toward absolutism. For example, if Professor Bradley's suggestion that Holland should be reversed were accepted, states would exercise a vast new power in reviewing treaties that would severely hamper the federal government's ability to meet obligations and surely solidify the United States' reputation as an international scofflaw. To avoid this, the U.S. federal government could simply adopt a practice of not ratifying any treaties that implicate state interests. This practice would prevent U.S. conflicts with international law but would not meet the federal government's needs. For example, 102 . See supra note 100. 103. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 432. Those consequences would not include being dragged into the ICJ now that the Bush administration has withdrawn the United States from the optional protocol giving the ICJ jurisdiction over conflicts arising under the VCCR. Liptak are not state-specific and the most common legal test concerning state citizenship rests on the intent of the person in question. 1 9 Without some type of reform, therefore, foreign nations would be unable to identify whether a U.S. citizen came from the state party to the compact or a state that did not grant consular notification rights. At best, the foreign nation could only provide uncertain implementation of the agreement that would occasionally deny benefits to deserving arrestees. This is not an insurmountable problem, but it does present a significant practical barrier because the entire structure of U.S. state citizenship would have to be revised in order for states to create effective agreements with foreign nations. The United States could adopt statespecific passports and more rigid legal definitions of state citizenship. In the face of such extreme measures, however, the question arises whether there is a more practical method of reconciling state interests and international obligations.
II. State Involvement in the Australian Treaty-Making Process
Like the United States, Australia has adopted recent reforms to give states a greater role in the treaty process. While the two nations have similar constitutional frameworks, the Australian reforms have focused on state advice as opposed to federalism reservations or declarations of federal incapacity. In this section, this article provides a comparison of the two systems, relying on an article by Brian R. Opeskin and Donald R. . Courts generically hold that "domicile of a person is the place where he has his true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Wright, supra, at § 3612. Predictably, considering the requirement of looking at intent, this test has been criticized as being too difficult to apply. David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1968) (stating that " [d] omicile is an unsatisfactory test for American state citizenship... because it is difficult to determine"); see also Wright, supra, at § 3612 (cataloging some of the difficulties courts face determining intent). Considering the mountain of judicial decisions addressing the issue, see Wright, supra, at § 3612, it would seem that courts struggle to apply the domicile rule, and foreign officials could hardly be expected to do any better.
119. See supra note 118 (explaining the role of intent in determining state citizenship).
120. Opeskin & Rothwell, Impact of Treaties, supra note 37.
[Vol. 24:1
Just as in the United States, the drafters of the Australian Constitution provided for federal authority in foreign affairs. Whereas the Framers of the U.S. Constitution were explicit in giving predominance to the federal government in treaty matters, 121 the Australian Framers had cause to be more circumspect. When the Australian Constitution became effective in 1901, Australia's foreign relations were still controlled by the Imperial government, and the Constitution's drafters were wary about including provisions explicitly relating to the power to make treaties. 122 Nonetheless, Sections 51 and 61 of the Constitution have come to stand for the proposition that the federal government has the final word in treaty matters.
Section 61 of the Constitution states, "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth."' ' 23 As Opeskin and Rothwell explain, this archaic clause gives the current Australian executive branch, as embodied by the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet, the foreign affairs powers that were previously held by the Queen, including the authority to make and terminate treaties.
124
This provision, although vastly more opaque, mirrors Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution. 125 Thus, just like the U.S. President, the Australian Prime Minister makes treaties. The Constitutions differ, however, in that the Australian Prime Minister can ratify treaties without the legislative branch's consent.
6
The Australian Federal Legislature, like the U.S. Congress, is an organ of enumerated powers and is delegated power over "external affairs" under Section 51 of the Constitution. 127 The Australian High Court has interpreted this power to include the ability to implement basically any treaty signed and ratified by the Prime Minister. 128. "The upshot of the High Court's interpretation of federal legislative power over external affairs is that Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever their subject matter. Holland. Unlike the default rule of self-execution in the United States, treaties are non-self-executing in Australia and, therefore, require legislative implementation to become binding domestically. 129 To avoid the international embarrassment of ratifying a treaty that the Federal Legislature won't implement, the Prime Minister generally assures that legislation will be passed prior to ratification. 13 0
The states can also implement treaties and in some cases are better situated to do so. 131 For this reason, the Australian Federal Legislature sometimes leaves the responsibility to them, just as the U.S. federal government leaves treaty implementation to the U.S. states on occasion. 132 Nevertheless, under the Australian Constitution, if a state fails to implement a treaty, the Federal Legislature can always choose to enact pre-empting legislation. 133 Neither U.S. nor Australian states can independently form treaties with foreign nations. 134 Thus, just like the U.S. federal government since adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, the Australian federal government historically possessed sole authority to negotiate and ratify treaties and the power to implement them. While this model provided the federal government with the tools to meet its treaty obligations, it did little to protect states' interests. In 1975, two treaties that impinged on traditional areas of state concern regarding the environment and human rights entered into force in Australia: the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (hereinafter the World Heritage Convention) 3 5 and the Tasmania (1983) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 136 The states challenged federal implementation of these treaties as exceeding federal authority under Section 51 of the Constitution, but the High Court repeatedly ruled against them.' 37 It held that, as long as the obligation was bona fide and not an overt attempt to enhance the power of the Federal Parliament, the implementing legislation was valid.
13 8 While the bona fide requirement hints at a potential limitation on the Federal Parliament's power to implement treaties, the Australian High Court has yet to strike down treaty legislation as exceeding federal authority.
Although the High Court has not offered the states legal protection from the implementation of treaties affecting their traditional areas of concern, procedural changes in treaty making have made up for it, at least in part. These changes began in 1976 with the election of a conservative government that was dedicated to a policy of "cooperative federalism."' ' 39 This policy manifested itself in various attempts to include states in the treaty process. For example, in 1977, proposals were made to give states an advisory role in the negotiation and ratification of treaties. 140 During that same year, the Australian federal government published Guidelines on Treaty Consultation stating that the government would pursue federalism reservations where appropriate. The fact that Australia is a party to a treaty (leaving to one side a treaty which is not entered into bona fide) will itself suffice to engage the power to legislate with respect to external affairs, and will authorize the passing of a law so long as that law is reasonably capable of being viewed as conducive to the purpose of the treaty if it is also reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate, or adapted to, the circumstance which engages the power. The basic mechanism for state advice under the "Principles and Procedures" is the Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Treaties (hereinafter State Standing Committee). 145 The State Standing Committee is a body of federal officials and senior officers from the various states that meets at least twice a year. 146 Every six months, the federal government is required to provide the states with a list of current and upcoming treaty negotiations. 47 The State Standing Committee examines this list and identifies treaties of importance to the states and proposes mechanisms for involving the states in the negotiation of those treaties.
148
It also coordinates state representation on relevant treaty delegations. 49 Finally, it reports on the implementation of treaties that have implications for the states. 1 50 The "Principles and Procedures" incorporate other significant [Vol. 24:1 mechanisms for state advice as well. In 1996 the Australian Senate adopted a resolution requiring the preparation of a National Interest Analysis (hereinafter NIA) for every treaty tabled in Parliament. 5 ' NIAs are the procedural equivalent of Environmental Impact Statements in the United States.
152
Essentially, they are publicly available documents created by the federal government detailing the benefits and drawbacks of adopting a treaty under consideration.
153
The "Principles and Procedures" require the federal government to consult with the states during the preparation of NIAs for treaties that implicate state interests. 54 As part of the 1996 reforms, the Australian federal government also established a Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (hereinafter JSCOT).1 55 JSCOT releases reports on matters arising from treaties and NIAs. with the NIAs, make information about treaty making more readily available to the general population. 1 58 Finally, the "Principles and Procedures" establish a Treaties Council. 59 The Treaties Council is made up of the Australian Prime Minister and the Premiers of each state and provides an opportunity for the states to suggest federal adoption of treaties and discuss treaties referred to it by the State Standing Committee.' 60 The Treaties Council is required to meet every year but, in fact, has met just once since its establishment.' 61 This lapse may appear to tarnish the reforms, but a recent article suggests that it possibly reflects the success of the State Standing Committee, which has simply not felt the need to refer treaties to the Treaties Council. 62 Despite criticism that the Treaties Council has not met frequently enough, 163 state involvement through the NIAs and the State Standing Committee has received positive reviews from the states. For example, in JSCOT's 1999 report on the treaty process, New South Wales Legislative Council member Hon. Ronald Dyer stated that the State Standing Committee "mechanism at a bureaucratic level appears to be working well.
The officials are meeting regularly, and that is excellent.' ' 164 The representative from Tasmania, a state that has particularly suffered from the effects of treaties, 165 was not as positive, More recently, JSCOT released a report on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement that reviewed state participation during the negotiations. 167 The Agreement is of general significance to the states, but especially relevant are government procurement provisions that require the states to adhere to certain procedures when considering bids for government contracts. 168 While the states were disappointed by the level of consultation at the end of and after the negotiation process, 169 the NIA indicated that the states were active in framing negotiation objectives1 70 and were included as observers during the actual negotiations. 1 7 Furthermore, JSCOT found that most states were generally pleased with the amount of consultation and had praised the federal government's efforts "to be more inclusive than during previous negotiations." ' ' 72 The process of state advice in Australia seems, therefore, to be a work in progress but on the way to fulfilling state concerns regarding treaties.
The Australian model of state advice is not a panacea in terms of balancing states' interests and international obligations. First, the Australian reforms are merely procedural, and the federal government can always ignore state advice 7 3 or, in an emergency, ratify a treaty without it. 174 As Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hon. Alexander Downer said in 2000, however, "we would obviously try to get a consensus amongst the states and territories before ratifying a treaty which is of relevance to them." 175 Second, the states can also undermine the goals of the system by delaying or enacting faulty legislation when asked to implement a treaty. 17 6 Despite these concerns, however, the Australian model is functioning and has created a balance between state interests and international obligations that sacrifices neither.
III. A Proposal for U.S. Adoption of Australian Treaty Reforms
Although successful in Australia, would state advice be an appropriate remedy for the dilemma facing the United States over the proper place of federalism in treaty making? U.S. adoption of state advice certainly has historic charm, as the Framers' intended the President to consult with the states before signing treaties.
77
Washington's quick dismissal of the practice and the Seventeenth Amendment's final exclusion of states from any role in the treaty process, however, tend to undermine the strength of an originalist argument for adopting the Australian reforms. But that should not prove fatal to an argument in favor of adoption. Australia adopted the reforms without reference to historic precedent. More significantly, in 1994, the U.S. federal government enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (hereinafter URAA), which implements the international agreement of the same name. 178 The Uruguay Round Agreements establish many of the provisions that together form the World Trade Organization. The URAA requires the U.S. Trade Representative to consider state advice when formulating U.S. positions that affect state concerns on trade issues arising from the Uruguay Round Agreements.
179
The federal government's adoption of an act entailing state consultation in certain circumstances shows that it is neither unwilling nor unable to pursue state advice on matters of importance to the states. Furthermore, adoption of a JSCOT-like joint standing committee to review and report on treaties would be in line with congressional practice establishing numerous committees and sub-committees to oversee everything from agriculture to veterans' affairs. 
A. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S. States
Regardless of precedent, U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms would have significant concrete benefits for the states and the federal government. As far as the states are concerned, the greatest benefit would be the opportunity to access and consult on any treaty of importance to the states.
181
This opportunity would, in some ways, provide the states broader protection than the implementation of Swaine's state-foreign compacts; 182 the federal government's continued use of federalism reservations; or the reversal of Holland, Professor Bradley's extreme proposal for reform.' 8 3 These schemes are all deficient because they only provide states with protection in limited circumstances. State-foreign compacts must be authorized by Congress, and thus can only be adopted on the federal government's whim. 184 Similarly, federalism reservations are applied only when the federal government identifies a treaty as potentially interfering with state sovereignty. Under existing case law and contemporary practice, the "treaties" proscribed to the states by the Compact Clause effectively comprise those pacts to which Congress has not consented, and "compacts" are anything to which [Congress] has consented. Congress's power of consent, indeed, permits it far more authority than a veto, and includes the power to condition consent. Congress has employed that power to insist on federal participation in compact negotiations, to delegate to the executive branch the authority so that it may approve the compact and terminate it, to require federal participation in the administration of the compact, and to require the return to Congress to approve additional parties. Indeed, it would appear that Congress is permitted to stipulate in advance all the compact's significant terms, a principle vindicated by the lower courts in a case involving Landis and Frankfurter's favorite subject. Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 503-05 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
185. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Conditional Consent, supra note 7, at 415-16 (discussing how the 'executive branch and the Senate design and attach federalism reservations to treaties).
186. See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 1, at 419 (explaining that such cases would be rare under current the subject-matter federalism limitations on Congress). that the federal government can adopt treaties relating to commercial and trade matters under its Commerce Clause power and would continue to be able to do so if Holland were overturned.
187 Professor Bradley's suggestion, therefore, offers no protection in regards to these treaties even though they frequently have effects on traditional areas of state concern. 188 Under the Australian reforms, on the other hand, states could identify and consult on any treaty that they determine to affect their interests, including trade agreements. This is not to say that adopting the Australian reforms would unequivocally favor the states. From a states' rights perspective, the fundamental disadvantage to U.S. adoption of the Australian state advice system is that it would offer states no concrete legal protections. Using the Australian model, state advice and NIAs would be purely nonbinding procedures, and the federal government could ignore them at will and continue to adopt treaties that interfere with traditional areas of state concern.
189
A fear of unimpeded federal action, however, underestimates the effectiveness of procedural protections in U.S. law.
Consider, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter NEPA), which requires federal agencies to produce nonbinding Environmental Impact Statements (hereinafter EISs) before taking action that might affect the environment. 190 The Act is widely emulated and praised for its effectiveness in alerting agency managers of environmental concerns that might otherwise have been ignored.' 9 1 At best, it "opens governmental decisions to an unprecedented level of C) (1994) ). NEPA requires, among other things, that EISs include statements on the impact of a proposed action, adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided if the action is undertaken, alternatives to the action, and irreversible uses of resources predicated by the action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v).
191. Karkainnen, supra note 190, at 904-06 (presenting, but not agreeing with, praise of NEPA). NEPA has been criticized as too costly and burdensome, but the appeal of its procedural nature has convinced even critics to propose alternative procedural measures to replace it. See id. at 905-06 (rejecting NEPA but proposing an alternative "as thoroughly procedural in character").
[Vol. 24:1 public scrutiny,"' 9 2 and thus "creates powerful pressures on agency decisionmakers to avoid the most environmentally damaging courses of action." 1 93 Similarly, if state concerns regarding a specific treaty were presented to the President or Senate through consultation or a NIA, there would be considerable pressure on the federal government not to ignore those concerns without significant countervailing federal interests. There is evidence that this is the case in Australia, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that the federal government has a strong preference for getting state approval before ratifying a treaty. 1 94
B. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Australian Reforms for the U.S.

Federal Government
Adoption of the Australian model would not only benefit state interests but would also, through the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT reports, serve the public interest by bringing a degree of transparency to a process that in the United States is renowned for being secretive and autocratic.1 9 Furthermore, a paper trail could also serve the federal government's interest in meeting treaty obligations. Consider a 1997 assertion by then Governor George W. Bush's general counsel Alberto R. Gonzalez that Texas was not responsible for assuring compliance with the VCCR, because it had not signed the treaty. 196 The Clinton administration appeared sensitive to this sort of There would remain, of course, situations in which the federal government would want to adopt a treaty over state opposition. The Australian reforms would not completely remedy the unpopularity of such a move but might give it a degree of political legitimacy because, at the very least, the states would have received procedural protection. The Australian reforms also make allowances for keeping sensitive treaty talks confidential, 9 9 and would, therefore, not undermine the federal government's ability to negotiate such treaties. Consequently, U.S. adoption of the reforms would not significantly impede the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs and would provide it necessary political legitimacy to enforce its international obligations. This combination would ease the current tension between state concerns and international obligations and perhaps usher in an era of "cooperative federalism" in the United States.
C. Effect ofAustralian Reforms on Potential Federalism Limits to the Treaty Power
Even if the federal government and state governments were to cooperate and adopt the Australian reforms, there would still be the judicial branch to consider. The U.S. legal environment is substantially different from that in Australia. While the Australian High Court has consistently favored the federal government's ability to make and implement treaties, 200 the Supreme Court has applied limits to the U.S. federal government's power in a variety of areas, 20 1 and the treaty power could be next. U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms, however, could give the Court cause to hesitate in at least two instances.
Consider the Court's potential application of the anticommandeering principle to treaty implementation. In New York, the Court reasoned that the federal government should not be able to commandeer state officials to carry out its directives because it confuses citizens as to which political entity is responsible for them. 20 2 If this sort of reasoning were applied in the treaty context, it would prohibit the federal government from signing treaties where implementation is left to the states because those treaties are federal acts that must be enforced by state officials. 20 3 With the Australian reforms in place, however, citizens would have less cause for confusion as to who is politically accountable for treaties because the publicly available NIAs and JSCOT reports would indicate whether a treaty was favored by a state government or was adopted despite state opposition. 2°4 This transparency, therefore, could give the Supreme Court a reason not to apply the anticommandeering principle to treaties.
Similarly, consider Bradley's suggestion that the Court should overturn Holland. 20 5 The Court's reasoning in Lopez and Morrison would support this move. Just as the Court feared with the commerce power, an unlimited treaty power could lead to an unchecked federal police power 2 0 6 and federal interference in areas of traditional state concern.
20 7 Adopting the Australian reforms could not decisively prevent the federal government from ignoring state concerns and using its treaty power abusively. If the reforms were adopted, however, the Court might feel less compelled to provide the states legal protection because the reforms already provide significant procedural and political protection when a treaty implicates traditional areas of state concern. 0 8
The presence of these protections could also limit the consequences of the Court's likely adoption of the state sovereign immunity doctrine in the treaty context. While foreign nations would still be prevented from suing states for treaty breaches, the federal government might feel justified in suing to mend the breach because the offending state would already have had an opportunity to consult on the treaty and would be aware of its requirements. Furthermore, as previously discussed, if the state had approved of the treaty during consultation, the federal government would have a strong political justification for enforcing compliance.
D. Practicality of Applying Australian Reforms in the United States
Although adopting Australian-style procedural reforms would Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 4.2(c) (including states in the NIA process); see also ATNIA, supra note 170, annex 1 (providing an example of the inclusion of information on state consultations in an NIA); supra note 157 (providing various examples of the inclusion of state information on state consultations in JSCOT reports).
205. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 206. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("'[Ilf we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)).
207. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("'Were the federal government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern... the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur....' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
208. As indicated in the Principles and Procedures, the reforms are designed to "relate to treaties of sensitivity and importance to the States and Territories." Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, at 2.1.
[Vol. 24:1 benefit both states and the federal government and would potentially undermine the Supreme Court's reasons for applying additional federalism limits, the reforms come with a degree of risk. First, they have only been in place in Australia for a short time, and their long-term success in that country is uncertain. Furthermore, it is impossible to know what measures the Supreme Court might introduce to limit the treaty power in the future. If the Court decides, even in the face of the reforms, to prevent the federal government from enforcing treaties that encroach on traditional areas of state concern, the Australian reforms would do little to enable U.S. compliance with international law. In that case, the reforms would only serve as an additional costly instrument favoring state interests.
Even if the Court does not choose to limit the treaty power, these types of procedural reforms can be prohibitively costly. For example, although NEPA is frequently praised, the EISs have been criticized as too expensive. 2 0 9 This could be a major concern because the Australian reforms not only require EIS-like NIAs 210 but also the distribution of treaties under consideration 2 1 ' and the administration of the Treaties Council, JSCOT, and the State Standing Committee. 2 That Australia finds these reforms affordable 2 1 3 alleviates this concern to some extent in the United States, but it is hard to predict whether U.S. budget-makers will agree that the benefits are worth the costs.
Financial considerations, however, are only one aspect of a more fundamental difficulty surrounding the adoption of the Australian reforms in the United States: scale. Australia has only six states and two territories; the U.S. has fifty states. In the United States, similar consultations would not only be significantly more expensive, but could potentially take much longer. Of course, the U.S. federal government could easily control undue delays by establishing a principle similar to the one built into the Australian reforms that prevents treaties from being stymied by excessive state consultation. 21 6 While the time problems of state consultation could be managed, the scale of the United States would probably prohibit successful integration of a Treaties Council. In Australia, the Prime Minister and the Premiers from each state can comfortably fit around a table. In the United States, a meeting between the President and fifty Governors could not take the form of an intimate consultation. In fact, John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary that it was the difficulties of consulting with a similarly large group that caused President Washington to abandon the practice of seeking Senate advice. 217 After consulting in the Senate for two days on the 1789 Treaty with the Creek Indians, Washington supposedly said that "he would be damned if he ever went there again. ' ' 2 18 It is hard to imagine a U.S. President agreeing to any such consultation with the state Governors.
Conclusion
The practical problems of U.S. adoption of the Australian reforms wholesale are significant. The United States could limit the severity of those problems, however, by adopting only the most significant reforms: namely, the NIAs, JSCOT reports, and the State Standing Committee. The Treaties Council has not played a major role in Australia 2 ' 9 and, because of the difficulties of consultation between the President and Governors, is not really appropriate for the United States. Jettisoning the Treaty Council would lessen some of the time and cost burdens of the reforms and make them more palatable to the President.
The reforms would still be costly but no more so than other proposals attempting to reconcile the tensions between international obligations and federalism. Consider the remedy of allowing states to form international agreements. 220 As was mentioned previously, such a system would require radical and costly restructuring of U.S. methods of assigning state citizenship and passports, 2 21 while providing states less 216. The Australian "Principles and Procedures" were "adopted subject to their operation not being allowed to result in unreasonable delays in the negotiating, joining or implementing of treaties by Australia." Principles and Procedures, supra note 16, Part A.
217. HAYDEN, supra note 56, at 23 n. [Vol. 24:1 protection from the federal government's treaty power than the Australian reforms.
222
The potential benefits of creating a State Standing Committee, establishing a JSCOT, and implementing NIAs are considerable. Not only would the U.S. federal government have greater political legitimacy to enforce state compliance with its international obligations, the states would have the opportunity of consulting on any treaty touching state concern, something not possible even under Bradley's vision of a courtlimited treaty power. The reforms would also contribute a degree of transparency to U.S. treaty making, a process that has been derided as lacking democratic legitimacy. 22 3 This is not to say that adoption of these reforms would definitively remedy the tensions between state concerns and international obligations. The Supreme Court could still limit the treaty power to render federal government enforcement of some international obligations impossible. It is the reformation of the treaty process, however, that could give the Court the incentive not to introduce those limits, which is what makes the need for reform so pressing.
There is no question that a move to introduce a State Standing Committee, a JSCOT, and NIAs to the U.S. treaty process would face serious hurdles. The states would likely be pleased with such reform, as at worst it would supplement potential legal protections. The President and the Senate, however, would be certain to resist. Although Presidents and Senators have frequently expounded on the virtues of states' rights, 224 it has been the trend for the political branches to attempt to 222 . See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 223. See e.g., Damrosch, supra note 195 ("The president-centered model has been dominant since the days of President Washington, but in the more complex, globalized world of the twenty-first century, the treaty process should not be a closed, secretive preserve, as if the president were an eighteenth-century monarch with the Senate his coterie of courtiers."); Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. "War on Terrorism, " 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 51 (2004) ("While particular democratic deficits characterize lawmaking processes in the United States generally, the problem is aggravated in the making and implementation of international law. There is a lack of transparency in the international processes in which treaties are negotiated as well as in the domestic processes in which treaties are ratified with input only from the Senate and not from the House, unlike purely domestic legislation.") (footnote omitted).
224. In 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order on federalism "to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the executive departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies." Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) . President George W. Bush has also announced his commitment to the principles of federalism. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at National Governors' Association Meeting (Feb. 26, 2001) ("I'm going to make respect for federalism a priority in this administration. Respect for federalism begins with an understanding of its philosophy. The framers of the Constitution did not believe in an all-knowing, all-powerful federal expand their power, not give it up. 225 Despite this rather significant hurdle, however, adoption of treaty reform may be the only method for the executive and legislative branches to protect their treaty power from limitation by the Supreme Court.
Although state advice in the U.S. treaty process through a State Standing Committee and NIAs would not precisely resemble the Framers' vision of Senate consultation during treaty making, it would successfully integrate states into the treaty-making process for the first time since 1913. Furthermore, it would allow the federal government to continue to support federalism without sacrificing treaty obligations. For these reasons, lawmakers should consider the Australian reforms of the State Standing Committee, JSCOT reports, and NIAs as they determine how best to reconcile competing state and federal interests in the treatymaking process.
